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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the regulation of pornography has received much
attention. Traditionally, conservatives have scorned pornography of all
types on the basis that pornography is immoral. More recently, some
feminists have attacked pornography from a civil rights perspective,
claiming that pornography is the sexually explicit subordination of
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women that leads to discrimination against women in all aspects of life.1
Nonetheless, the first amendment currently protects all forms of por-
nography from regulation unless the material is deemed "obscene."2
Researchers, however, have shown that certain types of pornogra-
phy, such as violent, sexually explicit materials, specifically harm
women.3 The proven relationship between violent pornography and ag-
gression of men toward women evidences a need for regulation, but con-
stitutional barriers to censorship under first amendment analysis are
great. In spite of the evidence that violent pornography harms women,
courts have held unconstitutional the most recently proposed anti-
pornography ordinances.
The problem with the prototype of these proposed ordinances,
drafted by feminists Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin,4 is
the ordinance's broad attack on all forms of pornography on the basis
that pornography subordinates women. The Seventh Circuit premised
the constitutional failure of the ordinance on the ordinance's viewpoint
basis for prohibiting pornography. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held
that viewpoint discrimination is constitutionally intolerable, and female
inferiority is a protected viewpoint. Additionally, although the Seventh
Circuit did not decide these issues, the ordinance is alarmingly over-
broad and vague.'
In order for an antipornography statute to survive first amendment
scrutiny, it must be drafted in view of the constitutional obstacles that
have caused previous proposals to fail. To survive overbreadth chal-
lenges an antipornography statute must propose a regulatory scheme to
prevent proven harms, yet be narrowly tailored to prohibit only those
materials that cause the harms. It meticulously must avoid regulating
materials on the basis of viewpoint. A proposal also must be drafted in
the most specific terms possible in order to avoid the implications of
vagueness. In attempting to accomplish too much, the MacKinnon Or-
dinance ultimately accomplished nothing because the court adjudged it
unconstitutional. A proposed statute necessarily must do less to with-
stand such constitutional scrutiny. Nonetheless, a narrow proposal that
is executed is infinitely more efficacious than any proposal that fails to
1. See generally C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
2. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For the relationship between pornography and
obscenity, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 7-51 and accompanying text.
4. Throughout this Article, I will refer to this prototype as the "MacKinnon Ordinance."
5. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
6. The district court found that the ordinance was vague and established a prior restraint,
but that it was unnecessary to consider overbreadth as the ordinance was found to be unconstitu-
tional on its face. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1337-41 (S.D. Ind.
1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
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pass constitutional muster.
This Article is divided into five major sections. Part II explores the
need for regulation in the area of pornography. Part III examines the
constitutional hurdles that impede the regulation of pornography. Part
IV addresses the reasons for the failure of the MacKinnon Ordinance.
Part V presents an alternative ordinance. Finally, Part VI analyzes the
ability of the proposed ordinance to survive constitutional challenges
while effectively regulating violent pornography.
II. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
The 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography (the
Commission) concluded that a causal relationship exists between the
exposure of individuals to certain forms of pornography and several
harmful effects, including increased violence toward women.7 Critics as-
sert that the conclusions drawn by the Commission are unfounded, and
accuse the Commission's members of having preconceived opinions re-
garding pornography and of making conclusions in spite of insufficient
or skewed evidence." Nonetheless, most critics agree that the research
evidence adequately supports at least some of the Commission's
conclusions.
Social scientists Daniel Linz, Steven Penrod, and Edward Donner-
stein criticize the Commission's conclusions, which are based in part on
this trio's own sociological studies. The scientists analyze "gaps" be-
tween their scientific facts and the Commission's findings.' They main-
tain that many of the Commission's recommendations are incongruent
with the research findings.1" Most importantly, they claim that the
Commission failed to confine the harms related to pornography to the
appropriate forms of pornography. While the Commission recom-
mended greater restrictions on all sexually explicit materials, the re-
search demonstrated that sexually violent materials, not sexually
explicit materials, are causally related to the identified harms."
For example, the Commission recommended that state legislatures
amend the definition of obscenity to conform with the more expansive
7. ATT'Y GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 322-49
(1986) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
8. See, e.g., Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornography as Act
and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1600-03 (1988); Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, The Attorney Gen-
eral's Commission on Pornography: The Gaps Between the "Findings" and Facts, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 713; West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 681, 685.
9. Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, supra note 8.
10. Id. at 713.
11. Id.
1990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
definition enunciated in Miller v. California.12 Further, the Commission
advised states to amend their obscenity statutes to change the misde-
meanor status for secondary offenses to felony status,"3 and to require
judges to impose substantial periods of incarceration for convictions. 14
In-addition, the Commission recommended that United States attor-
neys,15 state and local prosecutors, 8 and the Federal Communications
Commission 7 utilize all available statutes and regulatory powers
against cable and satellite television programmers. Congress was urged
to enact legislation prohibiting the transmission of obscene material
through the telephone or similar common carriers (e.g., "dial-a-porn"). 8
The Commission also recommended a federal task force consisting of
federal agents and special assistant United States attorneys to aid cur-
rent United States attorneys in prosecuting and investigating obscenity
cases. "'9 Other recommendations included using RICO,20 public health
laws,' tax laws,2 2 alcoholic beverage control laws,2 3 and existing crimi-
nal laws24 to control obscenity. Thus, the researchers claim that the
Commission's recommendations were substantially overinclusive be-
cause they sought stricter control of all forms of sexually explicit mate-
rial, not just violent pornography.25
In light of the distinction between violent and nonviolent pornogra-
phy, the question arose whether the sexual context is relevant at all:
perhaps the violence in and of itself is the culprit. Linz and Donner-
stein, however, undermined this proposition when they examined the
relative contributions of the aggressive and sexual components of vio-
lent pornography in a pair of studies.26 In one of these studies, male
college students were angered by either a male or female confederate
12. FiNAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 491; see also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
The Court in Miller adopted a new three part inquiry that asked whether: (1) under contemporary
community standards, the average person would find that the work "appeals to the prurient inter-
est"; (2) the work describes or depicts sexual conduct in a "patently offensive way"; and (3) the
work lacks "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
13. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 495.
14. Id. at 561.
15. Id. at 520.
16. Id. at 530.
17. Id. at 573.
18. Id. at 485-86.
19. Id. at 509.
20. Id. at 515.
21. Id. at 559.
22. Id. at 548-49.
23. Id. at 532.
24. Id. at 523. Such criminal laws would include pandering.
25. Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, supra note 8, at 713.
26. Id. at 720 (citing E. Donnerstein, L. Berkowitz & D. Linz, Role of Aggressive and Sexual
Images in Violent Pornography (Univ. of Wis., Madison, 1986) (unpublished manuscript)).
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and then were shown one of four types of films: sexually violent, sexu-
ally explicit and nonviolent, aggressive toward women but nonsexual,
and neutral. After viewing the films, the male subjects were given the
opportunity to "aggress against male or female confederates of the ex-
periment.17 The results showed that the male subjects who viewed the
film that was both aggressive and sexually explicit demonstrated the
highest level of aggression against the female confederate. The aggres-
sive-only film produced more aggression against the woman than did
the sexually explicit but nonviolent film. In fact, the experiment re-
vealed no difference between the levels of aggression against the female
target in comparing subjects who watched the sex-only film with those
who saw the neutral film.28 Thus, the Commission would have made a
more sensible recommendation had it focused on regulating all violent
materials, sexual and nonsexual, rather than all sexually explicit mate-
rial, violent and nonviolent. According to the research results, the Com-
mission made both overinclusive and underinclusive recommendations.
Furthermore, the effects of violent pornography appear not to vary
with the extent of sexual explicitness so long as the violence is
presented in an "undeniably sexual context. '29 This finding further il-
lustrates the Commission's inaccuracy in focusing primarily on the sex-
ual aspect of pornography.3" The fairest conclusion to draw from the
study about the sexual context of material is that it is relevant because
the sexual context has a synergistic effect with violence that results in
the greatest likelihood of harm.
Because the most compelling research regards materials that are
both sexually explicit and violent, any legislative action should focus on
these materials. Linz and Donnerstein concede that direct extrapolation
of experimental findings in laboratory studies to situations outside the
laboratory is problematic for several reasons: 1) laboratory subjects may
not perceive themselves as inflicting harm when experimenters ask
them to perform artificial forms of aggression against confederates; 2)
violence is not sanctioned outside the laboratory, but inside the labora-
tory aggression is condoned, even encouraged; 3) the studies examine
subjects from a very narrow segment of the population (i.e., college stu-
dents); 4) the "experimenter demand effect" may take place, wherein
subjects attempt to guess and then confirm the experimenter's hypothe-
sis; 5) usually only studies that obtain positive results are published;
27. Generally, aggression is measured in terms of the subjects' willingness to administer elec-
trical shocks or other forms of "punishment" to a female victim; the type of punishment used in
this particular study was not indicated. See Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, supra note 8, at 719, 720.
28. Id. at 720.
29. Id. at 721.
30. Id.
1990]
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and 6) no one has yet developed either an acceptable operational defini-
tion of aggression or of what actually constitutes violence in the
media.31
Ultimately the researchers endorsed the Commission's finding that
the laboratory studies showed "a 'causal relationship' between exposure
to sexually violent pornography and negative changes in certain atti-
tudes toward and perceptions of women, as well as increased aggression
toward women. '32 This finding identifies two types of harm caused by
violent pornography: Harmful social conditioning and violent acts re-
sulting from viewing violent pornography. A third category of harm
considered below but not addressed by the social scientists is the co-
erced participation inherent in pornography production.
A. Social Conditioning
In the typical study, men first are exposed to depictions of female
victims who appear to be enjoying or reacting in a positive fashion to
mistreatment. The research then asks the male subjects to report on
their attitudes and beliefs about rape victims or to administer electrical
shocks or other forms of punishment to female victims. The results of
these studies indicate four harmful effects of viewing violent pornogra-
phy on men's perceptions of women: 1) changes in the perception of a
rape victim (e.g., seeing her as less injured and more responsible for her
assault); 2) changes in the perception of a rapist (e.g., viewing him as
less responsible for his actions and as deserving less punishment); 3)
greater acceptance of certain rape myths (e.g., that women like and
crave rape); and 4) more aggressive behavior toward a female target
than control subjects. 3 These results are the same whether the film de-
picts the victim as enjoying or abhorring the experience.3 4
The Surgeon General made similar conclusions regarding violent
pornography. Specifically, the Surgeon General found that pornography
which portrays sexual aggression as pleasurable for the victim increases
the acceptance of the use of coercion in sexual relations, and that in
turn, such acceptance appears to be related to sexual aggression. 35
First, as the Surgeon General's determinations indicate, attitude
dictates behavior to a large extent; the changes in attitude produced by
viewing violent pornography ultimately lead to greater violence toward
women. Thus, attitude changes cannot be divorced from the physical
31. Id. at 722.
32. Id. at 719.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. E. MULVEY & J. HAUGAARD, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL'S WORKSHOP ON PORNOGRA-
PHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH (1986), cited in Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, supra note 8, at 722 n.18.
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acts those attitudes produce and should not be considered separately in
an analysis of the harm pornography causes. When men develop atti-
tudes of acceptance toward violent sexual aggression, women are inevi-
tably harmed.
Second, whether or not these attitude changes lead to acts sanc-
tioned by criminal law, they are harmful to women. Many acts of abuse
do not rise to the level of criminal violations. For example, men who
view violent pornography may accept and perhaps condone other men's
violence toward women even in circumstances in which the viewers
themselves do not engage in violence. This tendency may lead not only
to men "egging" others on to engage in violent acts toward women, but
even to more insidious harm to women, such as male judges, prosecu-
tors, and jurors consciously or subconsciously going easier on accused
sex offenders.
Finally, women may be subjected to verbal abuse and similar mani-
festations of the belief that women deserve or secretly desire to be
raped."6 As one woman put it, "street harassment is seen as flattery,"
and unlike more egregious acts against women, men are not caught and
chastised for it.37 Therefore, with regard to the social conditioning as-
pect of the harmful effects of violent pornography, the criminal law is
insufficient. Regulation is needed to protect women from the harms re-
sulting from violent pornography whether or not they rise to the level of
criminal violations.
B. Violent Acts
The second major harm resulting from viewing violent pornography
is actual criminal activity. The Commission, the Surgeon General, and
the researchers themselves concluded that exposure of male subjects to
violent pornography caused an increased willingness to aggress against
females, at least under laboratory conditions.3 8 Critics of the studies
claim that the proof is insufficient. They point out that the occurrence
of rape predates the existence of any form of mass communication. Fur-
ther, they argue that much of the violence reported could have occurred
in the absence of pornography, and that most consumers of pornogra-
phy never commit crimes.3 9 Critics also contend that subjects may re-
spond differently in a laboratory setting than in the real world, so that
the studies' results may not indicate anything about real world crimes.
36. Linz, Penrod & Donnerstein, supra note 8, at 720.
37. Letter from Angela Marney to the editors of Off Our Back, reprinted in OFF OUR BACK,
Feb. 1985, at 26, 27.
38. See supra notes 7-35 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589.
1990]
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Therefore, critics argue, violent pornography cannot be considered the
sole or necessary cause of violent sex crimes.40
The question, however, is not whether scientists have absolute
proof of the effects of these materials, but whether the link that they
have proven is adequate to take action in an effort to stop the harm
that the researchers believe violent pornography causes. Regarding the
argument that laboratory studies may not indicate any truths about the
real world, it seems at least as likely that the studies do bear a relation-
ship to real events. Intuitively, it would seem that increased aggressive
attitudes would not dissipate upon moving from the laboratory to the
real world. Moreover, if we take this criticism to its logical extreme, no
laboratory studies ever could prove anything about the outside world by
virtue of their being conducted in an artificial environment. Yet, policy
decisions often are made even in situations in which no empirical proof
is possible.41 Because the question here relates to mental state and mo-
tive, clearer evidence is not possible given the current state of technol-
ogy. In light of our inability to read minds, this final extrapolative step
is not an unreasonable evidentiary imperfection; the evidence is cer-
tainly sufficient for a policy conclusion.
Because laboratory evidence and even reports from victims"2 can-
not precisely tell us the nature and extent of the causal link between
violent pornography and the identified harms, inevitably a risk exists
that regulation is not needed and poses an unnecessary impediment to
free speech. The risk of uncertainty must be balanced against the risk
of allowing violent pornography to continue to endanger women.
If pornography does not cause harm to women, regulation could
infringe on some people's first amendment rights and cause them to
lose revenue from pornography production. At worst, however, the evi-
40. In fact, some research has found a decrease in sex related crimes with increased availabil-
ity of pornography, indicating a cathartic effect. See COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, 272-73 (1970). Two important quali-
fications of this research, however, should be noted. First, the study, which found that the number
of reported sex crimes decreased during a period when pornography became increasingly available
to the general public, was conducted in Denmark between 1958 and 1969. In the United States
between 1960 and 1969, police reports showed that both the availability of pornography and inci-
dents of sex offenses increased. Id. at 269. Thus, the results of studies conducted in Denmark
cannot be taken as true for the United States, particularly when research conducted in the United
States during the same period contradicted the research in Denmark. Second, the study in Den-
mark concentrated on the effects of erotica, not violent pornography. More recent research has
shown that violent pornography is much more likely to lead to aggressiveness than sexually ex-
plicit, nonviolent films. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
41. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court stated: "Nothing in the
Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion [that exploitation of sex debases
and distorts the development of human personality and community welfare] and acting on it legis-
latively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data." Id. at 63.
42. See infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
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dence linking violent pornography with harm to women is merely un-
certain, and uncertainty about the nature and extent of the causal link
should not lead to inaction. In the context of carcinogens, the govern-
ment undertakes regulation in the absence of proof of precise causality
even when the regulation is extremely costly. 3 Although courts gener-
ally scrutinize government infringement of first amendment rights more
closely than government interference of economic relations, the point
remains the same: inaction has costs of its own.
Ultimately, the problem requires an allocation of costs to deter-
mine who should bear the costs of uncertainty in the context of violent
pornography and assault against women. Big businesses often are held
responsible for the harms they cause society, and it seems less perni-
cious to require the people who have chosen to produce violent pornog-
raphy to bear the costs of uncertainty instead of the women who are
hurt by it and who often have absolutely no choice in the matter, such
as in circumstances of rape.
C. Coerced Participation in Pornography
The Commission found:
Efficient as it is, the normal recruiting process for pornographic models is ap-
parently not fully adequate to meet producers' needs. It is an unpleasant, contro-
versial, but in our view well established fact, that at least some performers have
been physically coerced into appearing in sexually-explicit material, while others
have been forced to engage in sexual activity during performances that they had
not agreed to beforehand.4
The Commission based this finding on the testimony of several pornog-
raphy models who claimed that pornography is not consensually pro-
duced. These models claimed that they were forced into making
pornographic films by threats of violence or death, and then forced to
keep silent because the products depicted clear evidence of their will-
ingness to perform.
For example, one model testified:
It was clear to me that ... all of the women I met were systematically coerced into
prostitution and pornography in the same way a prisoner of war is systematically
imprisoned, tortured and starved into compliance by his captors. The difference is
that prisoners of war are not held responsible for coerced statements and acts but
when a girl or woman is coerced in this very manner into prostitution and for use in
pornography, she is held responsible.45
Another model testified that it was not unusual for the pimp to
43. Sunstein, supra note 39, at 601.
44. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 865-66.
45. Id. at 809-10.
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force girls into pornography by threatening them with death.4 Once the
girls or women appeared in pornographic material, the material could
be used to force future participation. For example, women are told that
if they fail to continue to perform, tapes and photographs of prior per-
formances will be shown to parents, friends, and the authorities.
4
Obviously, limits exist for testimonial evidence in the pornography
context. Primarily, the women testifying may lack complete credibility.
Shame or guilt may cause women to want to believe, or at least try to
make others believe, that they are not responsible for their behavior.
The Commission's report itself contained a section titled "Feelings of
Shame and Guilt,"48 which contained testimony of women who said
that their involvement with pornography later caused them severe de-
pression, some to the point of attempted suicide.49 On the other hand,
the testimony of law enforcement officers, victim counselling agencies,
and sex counselors reinforced women's testimony that pornography is
coercive in some circumstances.50 Regarding violent pornography, one
law enforcement officer stated:
I have talked to models and I have seen films where it [is] quite obvious that the
model[s] had no idea as to what they were getting into. Part of [a sadism and
masochism] film, when they start torturing the victim, tying them, whipping them
and putting cigarettes out on their bod[ies], is the showing of pain ....
Obviously we are not dealing with people that can act, .... [so the] pain is
very real.51
In spite of the limitations inherent in this sort of testimony, the evi-
dence altogether deserves some recognition.
Regulation is needed to protect women from coerced participation
in the production of violent pornography. The economic incentive to
those who produce violent pornography is great enough that nothing
short of regulation will impede the proliferation of these materials.52
Only regulation provides the necessary means of avoiding the harmful
social attitudes and violence toward women caused by violent pornogra-
phy, as well as the means of eliminating coerced participation by
women in the production of violent pornography.
46. Id. at 810.
47. See MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1,
32-38 (1985).
48. FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 805-08.
49. Id. at 799-801.
50. Id. at 866-68.
51. Id. at 868.
52. See MacKinnon, supra note 47, at 31 (stating that pornography is an $8 billion a year
industry); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 n.1 (1982) (noting the profitability of
child pornography).
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III. OVERCOMING CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
Government regulation of communication immediately evokes first
amendment concerns. The first amendment protects freedom of
"speech," speech being accorded special protection by virtue of its ca-
pability of enhancing self-government, self-actualization, and the dis-
covery of truth through the marketplace of ideas. Whether the first
amendment need be implicated at all in this discussion depends on
whether courts consider violent pornography to be speech for first
amendment purposes.
Even if violent pornography falls under the ambit of the first
amendment, government regulation of such material is not necessarily
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions
to the first amendment's prohibition against abridging speech,5" and vi-
olent pornography may fit either into an existing exception or may war-
rant judicial recognition of a new exception.
A. Violent Pornography Constitutes Speech for First Amendment
Purposes
Some commentators argue that pornography in general has no
communicative value and therefore is not protected by the first amend-
ment; it is nonspeech. Professor Frederick Schauer, a member of the
1986 Commission, is a leading proponent of this concept. Schauer ar-
gues that speech for first amendment purposes is defined by "the idea
of cognitive content, of mental effect, of a communication designed to
appeal to the intellectual process," and that pornography does not meet
this definition because it is "designed to produce a purely physical ef-
fect. ' 54 Schauer thus adopts the Platonic-Aristotelian conception that
the human mind has two competing aspects: the mind is subject to pas-
sions yet capable of intellectual reasoning. Schauer applies this passion-
reason dichotomy to the definition of speech for first amendment
purposes.
Schauer's approach presents difficult problems in line drawing be-
cause it attempts to distinguish between passion and reason. Schauer
maintains that speech includes the artistic, emotive, and propositional.
He asserts, however, that speech does not include material that pro-
duces a purely physical reaction because such material contains "'no
essential part of any exposition of ideas.' ,,55 Schauer argues that be-
cause pornography goes straight to the genitals without passing through
53. See infra notes 67-105 and accompanying text.
54. Schauer, Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Inter-
pretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899, 922 (1979) (footnote omitted).
55. Id. at 923 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
1990] 135
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intellectual processes it is better characterized as sex than speech."
Yet, he maintains that even erotic art or music, which appeals to the
passions and has a physically arousing effect, is protected by the first
amendment because it also produces intellectual effect. Schauer ex-
plains: "The first amendment prohibition of regulation of commingled
intellectual and physical effects is not intended to protect the physical
but to safeguard the intellectual content. '57
Even assuming that pornography expresses no ideas, Schauer offers
an unworkable method of analysis because of two serious problems.
First, because the question of whether pornographic material has intel-
lectual content is impossible to answer definitively, the Schauer analysis
potentially would allow courts, in the guise of a judicial determination
that the material is void of ideas, to censor materials that do express
ideas. Ideas do not necessarily belong to the materials themselves but
often are a product of the combination of stimulating materials and an
individual's insight. Considering the amorphous nature of ideas, the in-
tellectual value of pornography must be left to the eye of the beholder.
Otherwise, Schauer's argument could lead to the suppression of pro-
tected ideas.
For example, a judge might consider a piecemeal conglomerate of
unrelated video pictures set to music in a music video to express no
ideas and therefore not to implicate free speech concerns. More specifi-
cally, a judge could decide that incoherent words and images do not
communicate any message or ideology, and therefore that the concerns
for protecting ideas do not apply. Music video viewers, however, often
have insight regarding the artist's life or even the video producer's pe-
culiar artistic form that gives the incoherent images meaning. The in-
definite nature of the question of cognitive content in a piece of art
demonstrates the first amendment dangers involved in allowing a judge,
or jury unrepresented by teenage music video connoisseurs, to deter-
mine whether or not the art has intellectual value.
Second, if intellectual content is safeguarded when commingled
with purely physical reaction, this protection would provide a loophole
for producers of violent pornography. A rule that the first amendment
does not protect materials causing purely physical responses could be
avoided by pornographers adding some bit of intellectual content to
their products. Then the question inevitably would turn on whether the
physical aspects of the pornographic material were sufficiently predomi-
nant over the intellectual so as to render the whole product nonspeech.
This line drawing question would be as difficult and dangerous to an-
56. Id. at 922-26.
57. Id. at 924.
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swer as the question whether the content was purely physical.
Ultimately, pornography, even violent pornography, does express
certain ideas that deserve first amendment scrutiny. The fact that
Schauer says pornography does not deserve first amendment scrutiny
demonstrates the danger inherent in his analysis. Pornography gener-
ally endorses the concept of sex that is uninhibited and without com-
mitment, of sex just for pleasure. Traditionally our society has
expressed an intolerance toward such ideas about sex, but according to
Holmes's "marketplace of ideas" method, competition of ideas brings
about truth by popular acceptance in the open market.5 8 It would be
antithetical to marketplace analysis to allow censorship of unpopular
ideas; restrictions on the open debate provided by the free market of
ideas would seriously undermine our ability to determine truth. Regard-
ing violent pornography, it would be impossible for those of us who do
not engage in sado-masochistic or other violent practices to determine
whether we are missing something desirable if we never considered such
conduct.
Catharine MacKinnon's argument in favor of regulating pornogra-
phy implicitly maintains that pornography is speech. MacKinnon fo-
cuses on the sexually explicit degradation and subordination of women
which pornography perpetuates and argues that pornography is a civil
rights violation. Thus, she argues that pornography expresses the idea
that women are inferior and should be subordinated in violation of
women's civil rights." This approach does not preclude the characteri-
zation of pornography as a bad idea, but under the first amendment,
good, bad, and even vile ideas are protected. 0 MacKinnon's characteri-
zation of pornography causes pornography regulation to require first
amendment scrutiny, because it would be impossible for her to argue
that pornography is nonspeech after condemning its communicative
content.
Furthermore, Robin West points out that some women find por-
58. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market"); see also Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1.
59. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 3-4.
60. There can be no doubt that the first amendment protects even vile ideas in light of the
Skokie controversy. In 1977 the village of Skokie, a northern Chicago suburb, had a population of
70,000, of whom 40,000 were Jewish and 5000 were survivors of Nazi concentration camps during
World War II. In March 1977 the National Socialist Party of America announced its intention to
hold a march. The marchers would wear uniforms similar to those worn by members of the Nazi
Party under Hitler, and would wear swastika armbands. In response, Skokie enacted a series of
ordinances designed to block the march, e.g., requiring applicants for parade permits to procure
$300,000 in public liability insurance and $50,000 in property damage insurance. All the ordinances
were held to violate the first amendment. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'g
477 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
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nography valuable because it is liberating. 1 Pornography attacks "sti-
fling and oppressive societal denial of female sexuality," 62 and allows
women to grow sexually as it "becomes a site of feminist exploration
into what it has to say about desire, what kind of fantasies it mobilizes,
and how it structures diverse sexualities. '63 Because pornography does
not "tie women's sexuality to reproduction, to domesticated couples, or
exclusively to men,"64 it offers other possibilities for women. Women
who consume pornography seek and discover ideas in the material,65
thereby improving their sex lives and sexual identifications. Although
West focuses on sexually explicit materials, not violent materials, the
analysis is the same if we allow the possibility that a person might find
fulfillment in watching violent sex.
The merits, however, of the ideas expressed by violent pornography
are not at issue here. It is enough to observe that even violent pornogra-
phy expresses ideas, and that this expressive content precludes its char-
acterization as nonspeech and brings it within first amendment
analysis.
B. Violent Pornography Can Be Regulated
Although most people probably do not find violent sex or female
subordination attractive, the fact remains that violent pornography is a
form of speech. Similarly, antisemitism repulses most people, yet the
marketplace of ideas tolerates it because it is an idea. Suppressing re-
pugnant views would be a mistake under marketplace analysis: the mar-
ketplace is a truthfinding organism, and serves to expose truly
repugnant ideas. Thus, all speech warrants initial first amendment
scrutiny.
The conclusion, however, that violent pornography is speech under
the first amendment does not prohibit its regulation. Legislatures can
regulate speech when it falls under an exception to the first amend-
ment. This subsection will consider two existing exceptions to first
amendment protection as possible justifications for regulating violent
pornography: incitement of illegal activity and obscenity. Creating a
new exception for violent pornography also will be discussed.
61. West, supra note 8, at 690.
62. Id. at 692.
63. Id. at 692 (quoting Gordon, Variety: The Pleasure in Looking, in PLEASURE AND DANGEM
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 189, 191 (C. Vance ed. 1984)).
64. Id. at 691.
65. Id. at 693.
66. See supra note 60.
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1. Incitement of Illegal Activity
The Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible
in certain circumstances to prohibit speech that advocates lawless ac-
tion. Although this justification for suppression has been considered by
the Court since the early 1900s, the Court announced its current and
most exacting constitutional test for the regulation of such speech in
the 1969 case of Brandenburg v. Ohio.17 Under Brandenburg the gov-
ernment may regulate the advocacy of illegal acts only "where such ad-
vocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action." '68 This current standard has
two separate requirements: 1) the advocacy must intend to produce the
lawless action, and 2) there must be a likelihood of imminent harm.
Violent pornography should fall within this exception to the first
amendment because it has been shown to cause aggression toward
women. If violent pornography were to be deemed a form of incitement
of illegal activity, courts would apply the Brandenburg test in the con-
text of violent pornography. The first Brandenburg requirement may
appear to mandate that producers of violent pornography actively advo-
cate the harms associated with the material, that they intentionally
produced the materials for the purpose of causing the harmful acts. If
the courts constitutionally required this subjective standard, it would
be virtually impossible to regulate violent pornography under this ex-
ception. Most pornography producers probably are driven by an eco-
nomic incentive and operate without a specific intent to harm women.
While some courts adopt this subjective standard of intent,69 others
adopt a foreseeability standard. 0 Under the foreseeability standard,
courts would hold producers to have intended the foreseeable results of
their materials. This standard is akin to the "average reasonable per-
son" standard in tort law and allows violent pornography to fall under
the exception of incitement to illegality. Because producers of violent
pornography know or should know of the harms caused by violent por-
nography,71 and they still produce it, they can be held to have intended
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
68. Id. at 447.
69. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Goldfarb v. Service
Motor Freight, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 18 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Shapiro v. Roudebush, 413 F. Supp. 1177
(D. Mass. 1976).
70. See, e.g., United States v. White, 769 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1985); Krause v. Rhodes, 570
F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th
Cir. 1970).
71. Considering the publicity the pornography industry has received over the last several
years, particularly the findings of the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, pro-
ducers would be hard pressed to argue they were unaware of the harms associated with violent
pornography. Moreover, producers of violent pornography should be expected to know of the
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the harms caused by the pornography. Although the Brandenburg case
more clearly presented the intent requirement, unless the Supreme
Court definitively resolves the courts' split on the intent issue in favor
of requiring subjective intent, the Brandenburg test will not impede the
regulation of violent pornography on grounds that it incites crime.
The second Brandenburg requirement is that there be a likelihood
of imminent harm. "Likelihood" and "imminence" are inherently vague
terms, and because the Court has yet to rule in favor of state regulation
on this issue, it is necessary to distinguish violent pornography from
cases in which the Court has not found a likelihood of imminent harm.
In Brandenburg the Court held unconstitutional an Ohio statute
that "by its own words and as applied, purport[ed] to punish mere ad-
vocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with
others merely to advocate the described type of action. 72 The appel-
lant was a Ku Klux Klan leader who had invited a reporter to a Klan
rally where derogatory statements were made about blacks and Jews.
One Klan speaker said, "Personally, I believe the nigger should be re-
turned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel. 73 In a separate speech
another Klan member said, "We're not a revengent [sic] organization,
but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have
to be some revengance [sic] taken."74 In determining whether these
speeches deserved constitutional protection, the Court stated, "'the
mere abstract teaching. . . of the moral propriety or even moral neces-
sity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a
group for violent action and steeling it to such action.' ,,7' In other
words, the Court found a distinction between "mere advocacy" and in-
citement to crime.
Violent pornography presents a better case for a court to find in-
citement to imminent harm than the facts of Brandenburg. In Bran-
denburg the political rhetoric regarding resorting to violence is
tempered by the Klan speaker's own words about taking vengeance.
The language "[I]f [the government] continues . . . it is possible . . ."
indicates that the threat is unlikely to occur at all, let alone immi-
nently. Political speech is notoriously replete with emotion and false
threats,76 but the harms associated with violent pornography have oc-
harms associated with the material.
72. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 447.
74. Id. at 446.
75. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
76. See Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 928. In the context of a racially heated boycott
the Court stated that "advocate[s] must be free to stimulate [their] audience[s] with spontaneous
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curred many times and are virtually certain to continue. It is not neces-
sary to show that a particular producer's film caused a particular harm
in order to justify regulating violent pornography. Rather, when certain
actions have a known propensity to cause harm, an actor can be held
liable without a showing of actual harm. For example, speeding is
known to increase the likelihood of car collisions, and drivers are pun-
ished for this dangerous behavior whether or not their particular sprees
cause collisions. Violent pornography, like speeding, is intrinsically dan-
gerous, and legislatures may regulate it on the basis of its known pro-
pensity for harm without a showing of particular harm.
The harm from violent pornography is also imminent, considering
that some men read from pornographic magazines while they commit
sex crimes, or force women to engage in acts they just learned about
through viewing a pornographic film." The government in Branden-
burg failed to identify actual harms likely to occur given that no scien-
tific data exists that associates listening to Ku Klux Klan speeches with
kidnapping and sending blacks to Africa or Jews to Israel. On the other
hand, researchers agree that a causal effect links the viewing of violent
pornography with the sex crimes that are rampant in American soci-
ety.78 Unlike the political speeches given in Brandenburg, violent por-
nography does not merely express ideas but actually causes harm, a
reality confirmed by scientific data.79 Therefore, the imminence of harm
is more certain from violent pornography than from the political
ramblings of a Ku Klux Klan leader.
In Hess v. Indiana"o the Court reversed a conviction of an unruly
person who shouted, "We'll take the. . . street later" during an antiwar
demonstration. The Court found the likelihood and imminence of harm
in the situation insufficient to meet Brandenburg requirements: "[A]t
worst, [the statement] amounted to nothing more than advocacy of ille-
gal action at some indefinite future time."8' The government produced
no clear evidence that the speech would have caused actual harm.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.5 2 the Court reversed a state
court decision that held an NAACP sponsored boycott of white
merchants unlawful and held the organizers of the boycott liable to the
merchants for damages resulting from customers' fear of patronizing
and emotional appeals for unity and action in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite
lawless action, they must be regarded as protected speech." Id.
77. See West, supra note 8, at 686-90.
78. See supra notes 7-51 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
80. 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973). The defendant may have shouted, "We'll take the . . . street
again." Id.
81. Id. at 108.
82. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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the merchants' businesses. The fear was grounded in part in a state-
ment made by an NAACP official during a public speech to several
hundred people. The speaker said, "If we catch any of you going in any
of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." 3 The Court
stated: "[M] ere advocacy of the use of force or violence does not remove
speech from the protection of the [f]irst [a]mendment. . . . The emo-
tionally charged rhetoric of [the speaker] did not transcend the bounds
of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg.' s4
Violent pornography is distinguishable from these two cases in the
same way that it is distinguishable from Brandenburg. Research evi-
dence concludes that violent pornography incites harm, and harm from
violent pornography has happened, is happening, almost certainly will
continue to happen, and is therefore far from speculative. One other
important distinction between these cases utilizing the Brandenburg
test and violent pornography should be considered. In Brandenburg,
Hess, and Claiborne, the Court decided the issues in the context of po-
litical speech. The Supreme Court repeatedly has stressed the need for
"wide-open" and "robust" political debate in a self-governing society.8 5
On the hierarchy of speech, political speech ranks at the very top.86 On
the other hand, violent pornography cannot seriously be deemed to en-
hance the democratic process; its first amendment value is more ques-
tionable. When the Court determines an expression at issue not to have
significant first amendment value, as in obscenity cases, the Court re-
quires the State to demonstrate only an arguable correlation between
that expression and the occurrence of harm to justify a legislative deter-
mination that the expression causes harm. 7
For example, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slatonss the Court held in
the context of obscenity that "[a]lthough there is no conclusive proof of
a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material, the leg-
islature . . . could quite reasonably determine that such a connection
does or might exist."8 " Similarly, with regard to allowing the Atlanta
City Council to disperse adult theatres, the Court required only a "fac-
83. Id. at 902.
84. Id. at 927, 928.
85. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that "we
consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
86. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
87. See Note, Anti-Pornography Laws and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REv. 460,
476-78 (1984) (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality deci-
sion); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250
(1952)).
88. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
89. Id. at 60-61.
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tual basis" for the City Council's conclusion that the presence of adult
theatres caused neighborhood deterioration." Even if the evidence of
harm is not absolute, it may suffice in view of the context and nature of
the speech.
2. Obscenity
The Supreme Court has had considerable trouble defining obscen-
ity and its boundaries. Since 1815 when a Pennsylvania court decided
the first reported American case involving censorship of pornography,91
one constant has emerged. The Court has held consistently that obscen-
ity, however it may be defined, is outside of the first amendment's
protection. 2
Under the obscenity exception only those materials the Court
deems obscene under its test for obscenity are without first amendment
protection. The first amendment protects many sexually explicit and
pornographic materials. If, however, sexually explicit material meets
specific criteria required for the Court to deem it obscene, the first
amendment does not protect the material. Currently, courts define ob-
scenity by reference to a three prong test articulated in Miller v. Cali-
fornia." The Miller test asks whether: 1) the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2) the work depicts or de-
scribes in a patently offensive way the sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by applicable state law; and 3) the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.94 By failing to meet
the requirements under any one of these prongs, pornographic material
will be deemed not obscene, and therefore worthy of first amendment
protection.
Many materials could be banned under the obscenity exception
that presently are not banned. Considering the underlying policy justifi-
cations for regulating obscenity, the Court has articulated the test for
obscenity in a more restrictive fashion than the exception warrants. In
light of the underlying justifications for the obscenity exception,95 it
90. Id. (citing Young, 427 U.S. at 71).
91. See Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815) (holding that an offense
that tends to the corruption of morals, such as the exhibition of an obscene drawing, is indictable
at common law).
92. See Note, Child Pornography: Ban the Speech and Spare the Child?-New York v. Fer-
ber, 32 DE PAuL L. Rav. 685, 699-700 (1983) (citing Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Jacobel-
lis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
93. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
94. Id. at 24.
95. For discussion of these justifications, see infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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should encompass all violent pornography. The argument here is not
that courts should deem violent pornography obscene under the Miller
test. Rather, evaluation reveals that the same justifications for not ac-
cording first amendment protection to obscenity apply with equal force
to violent pornography.
Throughout the Court's history of obscenity adjudication, three
primary justifications have undergirded the Court's decisions. First, ob-
scenity is utterly without redeeming social value. "All ideas having even
the slightest redeeming social importance- . . . even ideas hateful to
the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guar-
anties . . . .But implicit in the history of the [f]irst [a]mendment is
the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance."96 Second, obscenity increases the likelihood of sexual violence.
The Court has held:
[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercial-
ized obscenity . . . .These include the interest of the public in the quality of life
and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city cen-
ters, and, possibly, the public safety itself.. . . [T]here is at least an arguable cor-
relation between obscene material and crime .
Third, obscenity degrades society's moral values. The Court has said
that just as good literature enriches society's moral values, obscenity
debases them.9 In addition the Court has stated:
The sum of experience. . . affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that
a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted
by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a
State from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because
there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data. 9
Violent pornography meets each of these historical policy justifica-
tions for regulating obscenity. First, although "utterly without redeem-
ing social value" is no longer the standard, 100 violent pornography
cannot be considered more valuable than obscenity. The Court has said
that obscenity lacks socially redeeming value. 101 It does not follow that
sexually explicit violence contains more social value than sexually ex-
plicit material that appeals to the prurient interest or is patently
offensive.
Second, the empirical data indicates that the form of sexually ex-
plicit material which presents the greatest likelihood of causing sexual
96. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (footnote omitted).
97. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973) (emphasis added).
98. See id. at 63.
99. Id.
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 96.
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violence is violent pornography. The evidence is much weaker with re-
gard to sexually explicit, nonviolent material.102 If the possibility of in-
creased sexual violence provides a justification for regulating obscenity,
it provides an even greater justification for regulating violent
pornography.
Third, violent pornography degrades women far more than obscene
material. As noted above, studies reveal that exposure to violent por-
nography leads men to develop personality traits inconsistent with a
healthy family and community."' Even obscenity's crass exploitation of
sex seems less degrading and morally perverse than the perception of
women as deserving or enjoying sexual abuse, the result of violent
pornography.
On a normative level the harms of violent pornography present a
more urgent need for regulation than the application of a judicial test
that bases its condemnation of materials on whether they appeal to the
prurient interest.104 According to the Court, prurient interest is a
shameful or morbid interest in sex, as contrasted with a normal or
healthy interest.10 5 Even the most all consuming interest in sex seems
less harmful to society than the harms associated with violent pornogra-
phy. With its preoccupation with prurience, the Court appears to at-
tempt to regulate morality. The Court endorses a Puritanical
conception of sex, deeming excessive interest in sex as harmful to soci-
ety. Certainly the harm of violent pornography's appeal to violence to-
ward others provides a sounder basis for regulation than any materials
that appeal to the prurient interest.
The fundamental reasons underlying the obscenity exception apply
to violent pornography with equal or greater force than to material that
excites lust or lewdness. Therefore, all violent pornography should be
included within the obscenity exception.
3. Creating a New Exception
If the Court declines to recognize that either the incitement of ille-
gal activity or obscenity exceptions to the first amendment encompasses
violent pornography, the Court could create a new exception for violent
pornography. The Court most recently adopted a new exception involv-
ing pornography in New York v. Ferber.10 6
In Ferber the Court excepted child pornography from the protec-
102. See supra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Such traits include decreased sympathy
toward women and increased acceptance of physical coercion.
104. See generally Sunstein, supra note 39.
105. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491, 499 (1985).
106. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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tion of the first amendment. The Court provided five reasons for its
decision. First, the state has a compelling interest in the physical and
psychological well-being of children. 10 7 Second, the distribution of child
pornography is related intrinsically to the sexual abuse of children. The
process of making the material sexually exploits children; the sexual ex-
ploitation is inextricable from the material itself, and the material is
evidence that the harm has occurred. 10 8 Third, the advertisement and
sale of child pornography are economically motivated and thus are an
integral part of such materials' production.10 9 Fourth, the Court consid-
ered it "unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual
acts or lewdly exhibiting their genitals would often constitute an impor-
tant and necessary part of a literary performance or scientific or educa-
tional work."" 0 Finally, it is appropriate to except an entire
classification of materials from first amendment protection when "the
evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive inter-
ests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required.""'
The Court did not need to create a new exception in order to hold
that the first amendment does not protect child pornography. The
Court could have reached its conclusion that the government can sup-
press child pornography by using the same rationale it uses in obscenity
cases. A modification of the definition of obscenity to include material
appealing to the prurient interests of pedophiles would leave most child
pornography unprotected by the first amendment."12
Instead, the Court created a new exception because it could not
regulate all child pornography under the obscenity definition given that
all child pornography may not be adjudged obscene. The Court created
a broad new exception in order to give the government greater power to
control child pornography and its inherent harms. With this action, the
Court demonstrated a willingness to provide a new exception when ex-
isting first amendment exceptions could not control the harms from a
particular type of material. Similarly, the Court should create a new
exception covering all violent pornography because existing exceptions
allow some violent pornography to escape regulation and thereby deny
the government adequate leverage to control the harms violent pornog-
raphy causes.
The justifications underlying the Ferber decision differ from the ra-
107. Id. at 756.
108. Id. at 759.
109. Id. at 761.
110. Id. at 762-63.
111. Id. at 763-64.
112. See Note, supra note 92, at 708.
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tionales behind all the other recognized first amendment exceptions.
For instance, Ferber does not focus on the harm to society caused by
the communication of the speech. Audience reaction is irrelevant to the
decision.113 Instead, it focuses on the harm that necessarily occurs to
children in the production process.114 Thus, the Court's decision indi-
rectly deters the harms of child pornography. Producers and distribu-
tors of child pornography are criminally liable regardless of whether
they participate in the production process. This approach deters distri-
bution, which in turn deters production, and ultimately eliminates the
market for the material. Once the market is dry, pornographers will
cease to make child pornography, and consequently the harm to chil-
dren during the production stage will end.
The Ferber decision makes sense because of the impracticality of
always preventing a harm through existing criminal law. When the
criminal law is not entirely effective to prevent a particular harm, the
legal definition of the crime should be expanded to cover events inextri-
cably tied to the harm. Particularly in a commercial context, where the
market and the product are continually shaping one another, courts or
legislatures appropriately can control both the market and the product
through criminal sanctions because the ultimate harm is attributable to
both factors. As the Court stated:
[W]ere the statutes outlawing the employment of children in these films and photo-
graphs fully effective, and [had] the constitutionality of these laws . . . not been
questioned, the lflirst [a]mendment implications would be no greater than that
presented by laws against distribution: enforceable production laws would leave no
child pornography to be marketed." 5
The Ferber analysis is not exactly on point when applied to violent
pornography because the government theoretically could enforce per-
fectly the criminal laws regarding the sexual abuse of women without
banning violent pornography. Pornographers might produce violent
pornography without breaking criminal laws by obtaining the full con-
sent of female participants, and by simulating the violence. By contrast,
child pornography cannot be produced without harming children given
that the definition of the crime includes the act of production itself,
regardless of the child's consent.116
113. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (finding that the Miller standard is not a satisfactory solution to
the problem of child pornography).
114. Id. at 759-61.
115. Id. at 762.
116. The child's consent would have no legal significance in this situation because the con-
sent of a minor is invalid. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3)(b) (1962) (stating that assent
does not constitute consent if "it is given by a person who by reason of youth ... is manifestly
unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or
harmfulness of the conduct").
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Nonetheless, the more general principle that the Court established
in Ferber, namely the ability of government to stop the harms inextri-
cably linked to a particular, narrowly defined form of communication,
applies to permit regulation of violent pornography. Such regulation
would hinder indirectly many types of crime including assault, battery,
and rape. The regulation of violent pornography on the basis of its pro-
pensity to cause aggression indirectly inhibits crimes produced by that
aggression. As in Ferber, the regulation will affect only a narrow class of
materials that are closely associated with crimes that the existing crimi-
nal law is insufficient to deter.
In sum, a great harm is inextricably bound to violent pornography,
and the expressive value of violent pornography is minimal. The evil
involved overwhelmingly outweighs any expressive interests, and the
existing criminal law fails to deter the harm. The only realistic way to
deter the crime is to eliminate the market for violent pornography.
Prohibiting the production and distribution of a narrowly defined class
of violent pornography provides a workable and effective deterrent
against the crimes violent pornography causes.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE MACKINNON ORDINANCE
The MacKinnon Ordinance's fundamental premise is that pornog-
raphy promotes sex discrimination. The ordinance provides for civil ac-
tions against violators by any person claiming to have been
discriminated against or any member of the board or employee of a spe-
cial equal opportunity office who has reasonable cause to believe that a
discriminatory violation has occurred. 117 The ordinance first was intro-
duced in Minneapolis and Indianapolis. In Minneapolis the local coun-
cil passed the ordinance, but the mayor vetoed it on the grounds that it
violated the first amendment." 8 In Indianapolis the City successfully
enacted the ordinance, but the law immediately met first amendment
challenges. The Seventh Circuit held the ordinance unconstitutional,
and the Supreme Court summarily affirmed that decision in American
Booksellers v. Hudnut. 9
The MacKinnon Ordinance cannot withstand constitutional scru-
tiny for three reasons. First, the definition of the harm is infirm and
violates established Supreme Court precedents. Second, the statute is
both constitutionally overbroad and underinclusive. Third, many of the
terms and definitions under the ordinance are unconstitutionally vague.
117. Indianapolis and Marion County, Ind. Gen. Ordinance 35, sec. 4, §§ 16-17 (June 15,
1984) [hereinafter Indianapolis Ordinance].
118. See A Court Test for Porn, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 13, 1984, at 40.
119. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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A. Definition of Harm
The version of the MacKinnon Ordinance adopted in Indianapolis
and considered in Hudnut provides:
Pornography shall mean the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,
whether in pictures or words, that also includes one or more of the following:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in
being raped; or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or sev-
ered into body parts; or
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, tor-
ture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes
these conditions sexual;
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or sub-
mission or display.
The use of men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women in paragraphs
(1) through (6) above shall also constitute pornography under this section. 120
This ordinance defines pornography as a "discriminatory practice based
on sex which denies women equal opportunities in society." '121 Because
the focus of the harm is the subordination of women, which is not an
illegal act in and of itself, the ordinance cannot fit under the exception
to the first amendment for incitement of illegality.
Even if pornography does incite men to subordinate women and
view them as inferior, the view that women are inferior is not illegal.
Furthermore, the description of the harm in the ordinance places the
harm outside the obscenity exception to first amendment protection.
The ordinance covers material that degrades women yet falls to meet
the Court's definition of obscenity.2 2 As the Seventh Circuit in Hudnut
stated: "The Indianapolis [O]rdinance does not refer to the prurient in-
terest, to offensiveness, or to the standards of the community. It de-
mands attention to particular depictions, not to the work judged as a
whole. It is irrelevant. . . whether the work has literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value.11 2 3 The court's opinion demonstrates that the
MacKinnon Ordinance fails to restrict the material covered by the ordi-
nance to material that is legally obscene.
The ordinance seeks to remedy harm that centers on the political
viewpoint expressed by the objectionable material. MacKinnon herself
stated: "The feminist critique of pornography is . . . politics, specifi-
120. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q).
121. Id. at sec. 1, § 16-1(a)(2).
122. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
123. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324-25.
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cally politics from women's point of view .... Obscenity is a moral
idea; pornography is a political practice.' 1 24 This statement further il-
lustrates that neither incitement of illegality nor obscenity provides an
adequate exception from first amendment protection for the materials
the ordinance covers. Neither exception controls political practices
grounded in individual viewpoints. Only if the Supreme Court created a
new exception to first amendment protection for expression that subor-
dinates women could such expression be regulated.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the High Court proved unwilling to
create such an exception. Even if pornography subordinates women, the
idea that women should be subordinated and degraded is a protected
idea in the marketplace of ideas. "Under the [fjirst [a]mendment the
government must leave to the people the evaluation of ideas. Bald or
subtle, an idea is as powerful as the audience allows it to be."'25 Even
pernicious beliefs, like those of the Nazis or the Ku Klux Klan, are tol-
erated in the marketplace of ideas.2 6 Thus, the pernicious idea that
women are subordinate to men cannot be regulated without abridging
free speech. In fact, because viewpoint regulation is constitutionally im-
permissible, the more reformers seek to regulate pornography on the
basis that it perpetuates an unacceptable viewpoint, the less likely regu-
lation will succeed. 2 7
Indianapolis argued that marketplace analysis does not apply when
speech is unanswerable by counterspeech. The marketplace of ideas
analysis, however, is premised upon the notion that truth ultimately
will prevail when speech is allowed to flow unregulated. To limit speech
on the grounds that truth has not yet prevailed and is not likely to
prevail because no one has countered a "false idea" implies the exis-
tence of governmental power to declare truth. Under the first amend-
ment, "there is no such thing as a false idea," so the government may
not restrict speech on the basis of its "falsity.' 28 Tolerance of unpopu-
lar ideas is essential to the utility of the marketplace theory. The gov-
ernment should permit even the free dissemination of "false"
viewpoints because the exposure of these ideas will demonstrate their
weaknesses and aid in finding truth.
124. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 323 (1984).
125. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327-28.
126. See id. at 328. The Court added, "One of the things that separates our society from
[totalitarian governments] is our absolute right to propagate opinions that the government finds
wrong or even hateful." Id.
127. See, e.g., id. (citing Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). See generally Ste-
phan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REv. 203, 233-36 (1982);
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
128. See Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 331 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339
(1974)).
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Proponents of the MacKinnon Ordinance claim that pornography
is more than an ideology; they claim that pornography is itself discrimi-
nation. As the Hudnut court, however, stated: "If pornography is what
pornography does, so is other speech. ' 129 All of the negative effects of
speech depend on mental intermediation. Pornography may affect how
people see the world and how people interact socially, but action is the
result of ideological beliefs, not the beliefs themselves. 1 0
Although the ordinance is in part concerned with preventing acts of
sexual violence against women, its primary focus is far broader. The
ordinance targets a vast amount of material based on the ideology that
the material expresses. The ordinance defines the harm in terms of the
subordination of and discrimination against women, and implies that
regulating sexually explicit materials will stop the harm. 31 This ap-
proach is faulty because discrimination against women existed long
before pornography and likely will continue to exist in various forms
whether or not pornography is available. Further, the approach is
flawed because it establishes an approved view of women, how they may
react to sexual encounters and how the sexes may interrelate. Under
the ordinance only those who espouse the view approved by the ordi-
nance may use sexual images.132 The application of such a standard for
permitting or prohibiting sexually explicit images epitomizes viewpoint
based discrimination.
The characterization of pornography as subordinating women dem-
onstrates that the ordinance regulates on the basis of ideological con-
tent. Such an approach diametrically opposes the first amendment and
conflicts with prior Supreme Court decisions regarding pernicious be-
liefs. To pass constitutional muster an ordinance regulating pornogra-
phy must focus on direct, empirical harms from the speech, not on
indirect harms resulting from the adoption of the ideologies expressed.
It is unconstitutional for the government to eradicate resultant harms
such as discrimination through regulating beliefs that tend to cause or
perpetuate such harms. Regulation of ideology is governmental
"thought control," s so feared by the Framers that they created the
first amendment.
129. Id. at 329.
130. Id.
131. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 1.
132. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 328.
133. Id.
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B. Overbreadth
Even if the drafters of the MacKinnon Ordinance in Indianapolis
intended to deter the violence associated with some types of pornogra-
phy and not to control sexual and political ideologies, the ordinance is
fatally overbroad. It defines the materials subject to regulation in terms
of sexual explicitness. Then the ordinance regulates all sexually explicit
materials.13 4
The ordinance's focus on sexual explicitness poses the overbreadth
problems. Researchers have found that the degree of male aggressive-
ness toward women after viewing three types of films decreased respec-
tively with the following types of films: violent and sexually explicit;
violent only; and sexually explicit only.135 In fact, the researchers found
no difference between the level of men's aggression toward women after
viewing sexually explicit, nonviolent films and neutral films. This result
indicates that viewing nonviolent, sexually explicit materials does not
cause aggressive behavior. 136
An ordinance that regulates sexually explicit, nonviolent films is
overbroad if it purports to prevent aggression. Such an ordinance ig-
nores the evidence that sexual explicitness is simply a factor that exac-
erbates the effect of violent materials. Furthermore, violent, nonsexual
materials have a greater tendency to cause aggression than sexually ex-
plicit, nonviolent materials." 7 Thus, excluding violent, nonsexual
materials from the scope of the ordinance is underinclusive, while in-
cluding sexually explicit but nonviolent materials is overbroad. A more
logical ordinance would include all violent materials rather than all sex-
ually explicit materials. The best scheme, and the one least prone to
overbreadth problems, would regulate only materials that are both vio-
lent and sexually explicit. This approach would target the materials
with the greatest likelihood of causing sexual aggression and violence.
The MacKinnon Ordinance is also overbroad because it imposes
sanctions on speech that the first amendment clearly protects. For ex-
ample; the ordinance potentially regulates work by feminist authors
who use sexually explicit passages describing rape or male domination
to illustrate women's plight in society. While the writings may de-
nounce the subordination of women through illustrations of the impro-
priety and undesirability of female subordination, the ordinance
potentially could regulate such works on the basis of their sexual explic-
itness. Similarly, feminist artists may use graphic sexual images to ex-
134. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q).
135. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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press beliefs that oppose discrimination against women. While the art
may contain depictions of rape for the purpose of exposing rape's repul-
siveness, such depictions might expose the art to prohibitions under the
ordinance. The regulation of viewpoints, whether they advocate or criti-
cize the subordination of women, is unconstitutional. Ironically, the or-
dinance's potential to suppress the feminist material described would
be counterproductive to MacKinnon's efforts.
C. Vagueness
The MacKinnon Ordinance does not attack only a narrow class of
identifiable pornography. Instead, the statute defines pornography in
terms too vague for a reasonable person to determine what speech is
prohibited. Unless the ordinance provides adequate guidance for people
to whom the law may apply, the ordinance may unconstitutionally chill
free speech.
For example, the ordinance fails to identify what constitutes "sub-
ordination."'88 The term "subordination" requires a determination of
what specific acts or words depict women as inferior to men in rank,
power, or importance. Who should decide which acts subordinate
women? If women who bring civil suits decide, the inherent subjectivity
will make the definition of subordination impossible to predict, and will
allow individuals to impose their views of the meaning of subordination
on the public. If the judiciary decides, it necessarily would impose its
own view of subordination on a diverse community. If the population at
large votes on a standard for identifying subordination, the standard
would impose majoritarian views on freedom of speech, an imposition
antithetical to first amendment principles. 13 9
In addition, the ordinance is vague because it fails to define what
constitutes a "position of sexual servility or submission."1 40 Would a
depiction of a woman engaged in sex in the missionary position be con-
sidered submissive? If so, would it matter whether or not the woman
initiated the contact? Would all depictions of sexual intercourse need to
show the woman in a superior position? If so, would not this image de-
pict men as submissive?
The ordinance also fails to indicate what kind of pornography puts
women in an inferior status. Proponents of Indianapolis's version of the
MacKinnon Ordinance argued that "[tihe mere existence of pornogra-
138. See Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q).
139. Hunter & Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et. al., in
American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 UNIV. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 108-09 (Fall 1987-Winter
1988).
140. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q)(6).
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phy in society degrades and demeans all women.' 1M  Defining pornogra-
phy as material that degrades and demeans women does nothing to
resolve the vagueness problem, because deciding what material "de-
grades" or "demeans" is as problematic as defining pornography it-
self.142 The ordinance poses vagueness problems because a reasonable
person could not decipher what images the ordinance considers degrad-
ing or demeaning to women.
Another instance in which the MacKinnon Ordinance is vague is in
its prohibition of "scenarios of degradation."' 43 Under this undefined
term, perhaps a Miss America pageant depicts a "scenario of degrada-
tion." A contest that purports to honor the All-American woman yet
includes both a swimsuit competition and a test of intellectual prowess
based on answers to petty or superficial impromptu questions may
qualify as a "scenario of degradation.' 44
Because a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to dis-
tinguish between speech that is protected and speech that is prohibited
under the MacKinnon Ordinance, the statute could chill protected
speech. Further, because of the statute's vagueness, it could be subject
to arbitrary enforcement. The MacKinnon Ordinance is legitimate in its
objective to deter violence and discrimination against women. The ordi-
nance is unconstitutional, however, because of its definition of harm, its
overbreadth, and its vagueness.
V. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE ORDINANCE
The following proposal is not intended to constitute a complete
draft of an ordinance. An actual ordinance would need to include legis-
lative findings and policies in order to facilitate judicial review. Because
sections of this Article already have provided an examination of scien-
tific evidence on violent pornography and policy justifications for regu-
lating violent pornography, it would be redundant to include those
sections here. This proposal focuses on the crucial aspects of an anti-
141. Hunter & Law, supra note 139, at 108 (quoting Defendants' Memorandum at 10).
142. Justice Stewart commented on the difficulty of defining pornography in what has be-
come a famous quote. Regarding "hard-core pornography," he said, "I shall not... attempt fur-
ther to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it,
and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
143. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q)(5).
144. Although the MacKinnon Ordinance does not define "sexually explicit" and the swim-
suit portion of such competition may not qualify as sexually explicit, are not these contests even
more degrading and harmful to women because they are generally accepted by society? At least
pornography is considered improper or sinful to many people, does not purport that the women
involved were chosen on the basis of intellectual superiority, and does not enter prime time nonpay
television.
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pornography regulation: definitions, acts that constitute violations, and
sanctions.
The proposed ordinance reads as follows:
I. Definitions.
(a) Violent pornography shall mean a film that concurrently depicts both sex-
ual explicitness and physically violent acts between or among those engaged in the
sexual activity.
(b) Sexual explicitness shall mean:
1) human genitals in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal,
2) acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or sodomy, or
3) fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, but-
tock, or female breast;
(c) Physically violent acts shall mean:
1) assault,
2) battery,
3) murder,
4) rape,
5) torture, or
6) coercion by physical force.
II. Violations. The following acts will be violations of this ordinance:
(a) Production. It shall be a violation to participate in any capacity in the pro-
duction of violent pornography. Participation means:
1) filming,
2) directing,
3) acting (playing a role in the film),
4) coercing another to play a role in the film,
5) creating manuscripts for production,
6) editing films,
7) knowingly supplying the financial backing for producing the film,*
8) knowingly supplying the studio or other place where the film is to be
made,* or
9) knowingly supplying actors for such films, such as an agent, or parent or
relative of a minor;*
(*The standard for knowledge shall be the "reasonable person" standard, i.e., the
defendant knew or should have known.)
(b) Trafficking. It shall be a violation to deal in violent pornography. Dealing
means:
1) selling films,
2) buying films,
3) exhibiting films, or
4) distributing films.
III. Sanctions. The following criminal and civil actions shall apply to the foregoing
violations:
(a) Criminal sanctions. It shall be a crime to violate this ordinance. Penalties
shall be determined by the appropriate legislative bodies.
(b) Civil actions. A civil action is created and treble damages shall be awarded
for torts such as assault, battery, and false imprisonment that occur in production
of the film.
Most of the studies which found that violent pornography causes
aggressiveness toward women primarily used films to present the porno-
graphic material. In the interest of avoiding the criticism that the re-
sults of the film studies do not pertain to other mediums, the proposed
statute covers only films. Furthermore, films are a particularly harmful
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form of pornography because, unlike most other media, they accrue
specific harms in the production process.
The ordinance covers only those films that concurrently depict
both sexual explicitness and violent acts because studies have shown
that this type of film evokes the greatest degree of aggression. While
studies also have shown that violent, nonsexual films cause aggression,
an ordinance regulating this type of film would have difficulty because
of the tremendously broad impact it would have given the amount of
violence depicted in regular prime time television and mainstream mov-
ies. After first regulating the most dangerous type of fil and receiving
feedback from this initial step, legislatures may consider regulating
other types of film.
The ordinance covers all aspects of production and marketing so
that violators who were involved only indirectly with the actual filming
will not escape sanctions. The ordinance permits sanctions in both
criminal and tort law so that the law will be enforced both publicly and
privately resulting in greater potential efficacy.
VI. THE PROPOSED ORDINANCE SURVIVES CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
The proposed ordinance aims to curb the physical harms caused by
violent pornography. 1 5 As discussed above, the Court could except vio-
lent pornography from the strict first amendment prohibition against
regulating speech in any of three ways: By placing violent pornography
under the previously recognized exception for either incitement of ille-
gality or obscenity, or by creating a new exception because of the
unique and important harms violent pornography causes.
Even if the Court excepts violent pornography from the strict pro-
tection of free speech, the ordinance must overcome other constitu-
tional hurdles. First, because the proposed ordinance aims at curbing
actual harms that result from viewing violent pornography and not at
suppressing ideological ideas, it is properly motivated. Second, the pro-
posed ordinance survives overbreadth challenges because it regulates
only the narrow class of pornography that is both sexually explicit and
violent. Finally, the terms of the ordinance are understandable to a rea-
sonable person, and thus, are not unconstitutionally vague. Therefore,
the proposed ordinance satisfies constitutional scrutiny.
A. Propriety of Motive
The ordinance clearly aims at stopping the type of pornography
that can cause acts of physical violence against women. The studies
145. For a discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence of the harm itself, see supra notes 38-
43 and accompanying text.
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conducted by Linz, Penrod, and Donnerstein demonstrate that films
containing both sexual explicitness and violence cause male viewers to
manifest the greatest degree of aggression. The ordinance aims at elimi-
nating the crime resulting from these types of films by illegalizing the
narrow class of violent pornographic films.
Unlike the MacKinnon Ordinance, the proposed ordinance focuses
on neither sex discrimination nor the subordination of women. Rather
than making a moral or political judgment regarding the status of
women in our society, the proposed ordinance simply aims at sup-
pressing crime. Under the ordinance, if a pornographer produces a film
that includes the ordinance's requisite elements, the violator may be
prosecuted or sued regardless of whether the film expressed neutral or
partisan ideas. The proposed ordinance neutrally affects the market-
place of ideas.
B. Survives Overbreadth Challenges
The proposed ordinance survives overbreadth analysis because it is
narrowly tailored to regulate only those materials shown to have a
harmful effect on the physical well-being of society's members. Empiri-
cal data proves not only that the materials regulated cause aggression,
but that these materials have the highest propensity for causing aggres-
sion. While the ordinance may be somewhat underinclusive, any scheme
regulating pornography that would not be somewhat underinclusive
would be unconstitutionally overbroad. Provided the statute's underin-
clusiveness poses no equal protection problems, the underinclusiveness
will not cause the statute to fail on constitutional grounds: "It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be
eradicated or none at all. 14 6
The ordinance may be underinclusive because it regulates only film
and not the print media, thus allowing some harmful materials into the
market. Regulation of films, however, is appropriate because substantial
empirical evidence has been obtained using films. Further, courts and
plaintiffs can pick out more easily the elements of violent pornography
in films as opposed to deciphering which words or paragraphs in
printed texts contain the requisite sex and violence. Finally, films im-
plicate production harms that some printed materials, such as books,
may not.
The statute also may be underinclusive because it regulates only
sexually explicit violence. The studies showed that both films contain-
ing violence in an unmistakably sexual but not explicit context and vio-
146. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (citing Central
Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 160 (1912)).
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lence in a nonsexual context tend to cause aggression. The studies
showed, however, that these films provoked a lesser degree of aggres-
siveness than the sexually explicit, violent films. 147 While we should not
disregard films that result in any amount of violence, the ubiquity of
violence in all forms of the media makes regulation of these forms of
violence impossible. Violence, even in a sexual context, occurs in many
prime time television shows, soap operas, and even cartoons. Over-
breadth and vagueness problems make an effort to ban violence in the
absence of sexual explicitness unworkable. Thus, while some underin-
clusiveness is inevitable in our current state of knowledge, the ordi-
nance employs existing empirical data to ban films that evoke the
greatest violence against women.
C. Not Void for Vagueness
The proposed ordinance can also survive vagueness challenges. Sec-
tion (1)(a), which defines violent pornography, mandates that both sex-
ual explicitness and acts of violence occur simultaneously in the film.
Even if a film contains both sexually explicit and violent images, the
ordinance does not apply to the film if the images occur at different
times. Therefore, enforcers of the ordinance and film producers should
experience little confusion in determining whether the statute applies
to a particular film.
The definition of sexual explicitness in section (1)(b) is identical to
the definition of sexual explicitness challenged on grounds of vagueness
in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.14 In Young the Supreme
Court gave two reasons why the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague. First, whether or not some uncertainty existed regarding the ef-
fect of the statute, it unquestionably applied to the respondents. The
Court did not permit the respondents to challenge the statute on vague-
ness grounds. Second, the doctrine of vagueness only applies when the
statute's deterrent effect on legitimate expression is "both real and sub-
stantial." 4 There is "surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited ex-
hibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and
artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and
political significance.M5 0
Although the first part of the Court's vagueness analysis cannot be
applied in the absence of a specific factual situation, the second part
certainly applies to the ordinance. The concern that the ordinance inad-
147. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
148. 427 U.S. 50, 53 n.4 (1976).
149. Id. at 58-60 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975)).
150. Id. at 61.
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vertently would deter materials that fall outside the definition of vio-
lent pornography is not acute for such marginal material. If producers
cannot decide whether depictions in their films constitute violent por-
nography by considering the explicitly enumerated acts that constitute
the definition, their materials probably do not warrant extreme first
amendment concern. Furthermore, considering the lucrative nature of
pornography production, it is more likely that producers will push the
law to its limits than exercise excessive care.
Section (1)(c) of the proposed ordinance defines physically violent
acts. Four of the six acts listed can be understood by reference to tort
law or criminal law, which explicitly define the elements needed to sus-
tain a civil cause of action or criminal prosecution, respectively. The
two examples that do not constitute a tort cause of action or crime per
se, torture and coercion by physical force, can be understood by a rea-
sonable person, through reference to a dictionary if necessary. 15 1
Section (2) defines which acts constitute violations of the ordi-
nance. All of the terms refer to specific, affirmative acts that the aver-
age person can understand. The standard for the acts requiring intent
is the average reasonable person standard of tort law. By definition, all
people are held to the knowledge of the average reasonable person
whether or not they actually possess that level of knowledge. Judicial
proceedings determine whether or not the defendant has met the stan-
dard in any particular instance, as with all tort cases involving an aver-
age reasonable person intent element.
Unlike the MacKinnon Ordinance, the proposed ordinance refers
to no abstract notions like "subordination," "degradation," and "posi-
tions of sexual servility or submission.' ' 52 The terms of the proposed
ordinance are not vague: a reasonable person can understand their ap-
plicability, and the terms are adequately specific to prevent their selec-
tive or arbitrary application.
VII. CONCLUSION
Violent pornography is a serious problem in our society. The ag-
gressive behavior and acts of violence produced by violent pornography
warrant government intervention. A narrowly tailored statute can and
should be employed to regulate violent pornography and impede the
harms it causes.
151. Torture is defined as "the inflicting of severe pain to force information or confession, get
revenge," WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1412 (3d college ed. 1988), and coercion is defined as
the act of "constraining or restraining by force," id. at 270.
152. Indianapolis Ordinance, supra note 117, at sec. 2, § 16-3(q).
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